



Strong Objectivity and Situated Knowledges: Reassessing Feminist Standpoint Epistemology through Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway

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Abstract

This article examines the epistemological and methodological significance of feminist standpoint theory through a comparative analysis of the works of Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway. Emerging from Marxist insights into class consciousness and later feminist critiques of knowledge production, standpoint theory challenges claims of value-neutral objectivity by arguing that knowledge is socially situated and shaped by relations of power. Within feminist research, the framework has informed constructivist and reflexive methodologies that emphasize lived experience, positionality, and the co-construction of knowledge. The study traces the development of two key epistemological claims: the situated knowledge thesis, which holds that social location structures the conditions and limits of knowing, and the epistemic advantage thesis, which asserts that marginalized standpoints can yield critical insight into systems of domination. While Harding develops the concept of “strong objectivity,” arguing that inquiry beginning from marginalized lives can produce more rigorous and less distorted knowledge, Haraway advances the notion of “situated knowledges,” emphasizing partial perspective, embodied vision, accountability, and relational objectivity. Their respective critiques of empiricism, universalism, and androcentric science reconfigure the relationship between knower, knowledge, and world. Using a systematic interpretive review of feminist epistemological scholarship, the article situates these theories within social epistemology and feminist research practice. The comparison demonstrates that reflexive, socially situated inquiry enhances epistemic accountability while avoiding both relativism and false universality. By clarifying tensions between epistemic privilege and partial perspective, the study shows how Harding and Haraway together provide a robust framework for feminist research and offer normative guidance for knowledge production in contexts shaped by power, inequality, and epistemic injustice.

Key words: Feminist standpoint theory; Epistemic privilege; Situated knowledge; Strong objectivity; Sandra Harding; Donna Haraway

Introduction

Feminist standpoint theory has emerged as a central approach in feminist epistemology and social theory by contesting the assumption that knowledge is neutral and independent of social context. Drawing initially on Marxist analyses of class consciousness and later developed through feminist critique, it maintains that knowledge is shaped by social location and that marginalized groups can offer critical insight into structures of domination. In contemporary feminist research, standpoint theory informs constructivist approaches that treat knowledge as co-produced through social interaction, lived experience, and reflexive engagement. Scholars such as Guzman (2018) note that standpoint methodologies often exhibit a naturalistic orientation, insofar as they investigate knowledge practices within concrete social settings rather than abstract frameworks. Similarly, Gurung (2020) argues that standpoint theory is particularly suited to feminist inquiry because it centers marginalized voices while enabling systematic critique of power. Earlier work by

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Prins (1995) highlights the influence of Donna Haraway in shaping constructivist strands of feminist philosophy, especially through her emphasis on partial perspectives and situated knowledge.

Recent discussions underscore the complexity of standpoint theory as an epistemological, methodological, and political project. Cipriani (2020) characterizes it not only as a theory of knowledge but also as a methodological orientation that directs inquiry toward lived experience, reflexivity, and power relations. This shift reorients research away from detached observation toward engaged and context-sensitive knowledge production. Crasnow (2014) emphasizes that epistemic privilege must be understood in relation to the situated character of knowledge: a standpoint is not simply given by social position but is achieved through critical reflection and collective political awareness. Wylie (2003) further describes standpoint theory as a form of political social epistemology grounded in an “inversion thesis,” according to which those subject to systemic disadvantage may be better positioned to identify mechanisms of oppression. Methodologically, this perspective is reinforced by reflexive and praxis-oriented approaches. Sweet (2020), for instance, integrates standpoint theory with Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology to argue that marginalized positions offer crucial resources for analyzing social power and interrogating academic practices. Huirem, Lognathan, and Patowari (2020) similarly stress that standpoint methodologies foreground lived experience, showing that marginalization can be understood only by attending to how it is interpreted by those who experience it. Extending this line of thought, Paradies (2018) advocates forms of scholar-activism and new knowledge practices that respond to contemporary forms of epistemic injustice.

Standpoint theory also reconfigures the relationship between knower and known. Iris van der Tuin (2016) argues that it replaces hierarchical models of knowledge with more reciprocal relations, a shift that is especially significant in the human sciences, where subjects of inquiry risk being objectified. At the same time, philosophical critiques complicate its theoretical foundations. Changfoot (2004), revisiting Nancy Hartsock’s engagement with G. W. F. Hegel, suggests that the master–slave dialectic resists fixed gendered interpretations and that binary distinctions between dominant and marginalized standpoints may oversimplify complex identities. In response, Wylie (2012) calls for a more nuanced account capable of explaining the epistemic consequences of social differentiation while sustaining critical and transformative aims. Historically, feminist standpoint theory develops through critical engagement with Marxist epistemology, particularly its privileging of proletarian consciousness. Nancy Hartsock (1987) adapts this framework to highlight the epistemic significance of women’s material and reproductive labor. Catharine A. MacKinnon (1989) further examines the cognitive dimensions of gendered domination, especially through the analysis of objectification. Patricia Hill Collins and Sandra Harding extend these insights by addressing intersecting structures of oppression and the epistemic value of marginalized lives. Harding (1992, 1995), however, also critiques classical Marxism for its limited treatment of power and its failure to anticipate contexts in which marginalized groups gain institutional authority. Drawing on debates in the philosophy of science and critiques of feminist empiricism, she develops standpoint theory into a more comprehensive framework aimed at producing socially accountable and methodologically rigorous knowledge.



This article adopts a comparative philosophical approach that combines textual analysis, conceptual clarification, and normative evaluation within feminist and social epistemology. By examining Harding's concept of strong objectivity alongside Haraway's account of situated knowledges, it assesses the scope and limits of epistemic privilege and clarifies the methodological implications of socially situated inquiry. This study examines how Sandra Harding's concept of strong objectivity and Donna Haraway's notion of situated knowledges differently define objectivity and epistemic authority. It further investigates whether claims of epistemic privilege associated with marginalized standpoints can be sustained without collapsing into relativism or leading to fragmentation of knowledge. In addition, the study explores the possibility of formulating shared criteria for assessing competing knowledge claims across diverse social and positional contexts. The aim of this study is to undertake a critical comparison of Harding's and Haraway's theoretical frameworks in order to clarify the conceptual basis of situated knowledge and epistemic privilege. It seeks to evaluate their respective strengths and limitations in addressing questions of objectivity, power, and social location, and to develop a more coherent account of socially situated inquiry that contributes to ongoing debates in social epistemology.

Strong Objectivity of Sandra Harding

Sandra Harding is a leading feminist epistemologist whose work critically interrogates the assumptions underlying scientific knowledge and objectivity. Sandra Harding (1995) considers objectivity to be a contested concept, noting that diverse and often conflicting interpretations shape its meaning and application. She identifies four dominant perspectives on objectivity: (1) views that regard objectivity as a capacity possessed—or denied—by particular individuals or groups; (2) approaches that treat objectivity as a property of knowledge claims; (3) positions that equate objectivity with adherence to scientific method; and (4) perspectives that locate objectivity within specific knowledge-seeking communities. According to Harding, these prevailing interpretations fail to expand existing knowledge or ensure fairness in knowledge production, as they do not adequately interrogate the social conditions under which knowledge is generated. As the value neutrality aspect of objectivity is already questioned by other eminent writers, her main focus is on scientific methods and she of the view that scientific research practices are too weak in maximizing objectivity and in identifying androcentric and Eurocentric elements. The prioritizing agendas in the scientific researches support the dominant ones and therefore there is the necessity of strong objectivity. According to Harding (1992; 1995) Scientific methods have the difficulty in identifying the shared assumptions that reign in a community.

Sandra Harding (1995) instigates three momentous arguments in support of the strong objectivity project. Every science rejoices at the fact of discovery or rediscovery. Standpoint notion is a rediscovery as it brings into light the stand of the subjugated ones. Secondly, role of legacy plays a significant role in accepting or rejecting something new. Standpoint notions follow the heritage of Marxian reflections and the notions of feminist thinkers who stood against dominant ideology. Thirdly, concept of neutrality in objectivity will not be useful if one is going to perceive it from the male or female oriented approaches.



Starting the exploration from the experiences of the repressed contributes to knowledge production, according to Harding (1992; 1995). Traditionally the repressed ones are kept outside of the social institutions where knowledge is produced and classified. The inducement of the oppressed to know the views of the powerful promotes strong objectivity. Underprivileged social positions are sources for producing viewpoints that are less partial and less distorted. Strong objectivity, according to Harding, is beginning scientific research from the lives of the downtrodden in order to obtain the objective knowledge about the social realities. It can unveil the obscure existing practices that promote the existing beliefs. Standpoint theory begins from recognizing social inequalities. The restrictions that are placed by the dominant ones on the subjugated ones are not due to the activities of the oppressed ones.

Any knowledge production or research methodology that does not pay attention to the role of power can only contribute to weak objectivity. A researcher, who pays sufficient attention to the dominant elements of the social location, introduces lucid research results and discloses the role of power in the existing and traditional knowledge production practices. In traditional methods, weak objectivity could offer only generalizations and abstractions as failed in dealing with the terrestrial realities. Harding (1992; 1995) equates strong objectivity with strong reflexivity¹. The subject of knowledge should be placed on the same level for a critical analysis. The subject² knowledge should be understood as part of the object of knowledge. The social relations of the observers also must also be brought into the center. By focusing on the social relations, one will be able to identify the values and interests that shaped particular agendas. Strong objectivity takes the subject as well as the object of knowledge for critical and scientific explanations. Strong objectivity takes into consideration the relationship between belief that is situated in history and the belief that is objective. The practice of reflexivity recognizes the perspective of everyone who collaborates with the knowledge production and as such it suggests knowledge production as community endeavor not an individual enterprise. Though the starting point is the lives of the suppressed, it looks for bringing in creative narrations³ on the organized social orders that presents the lives of men and women along with their activities and belief systems which move them in the way they function. Creative narrations are effective in transmitting and accumulating knowledge in human

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- 1 According to Popoveniuc (2014, 205) "In the context of epistemological perspective, self-reflective concern the relation of theory with its author. It is an activity of finding or abstracting something about itself (about feelings, thoughts, and actions) but without producing them. As a process, reflexivity implies activity where by the act self-consciousness is determined or posited. SelfReflexivity is a superior form of self-activity in which the self-consciousness is produced, and it is sustained any form of self-consciousness. Self-reflection, self-reference, and self-reflectiveness are prerequisites for the individual self-consciousness of the author which finds him/herself within its own theory, s(he) finds him/herself thought by him/herself (up to the phenomenological level of thought thinking itself as a thinking)"
 - 2 Thomas Kuhn (1962) opines that mere use of objective criteria does not bring in scientific truth. One must account for subjective view points as the objective judgement is established on subjective conditioning.
 - 3 The concept of embodied narration (Conrad, 2021) suggests that body itself can produce, reproduce or challenge existing knowledge and power structures. It is the expression of the body's stories.



communities (Harding, 1995). Though the experiences of women and their way of elaboration are thought provoking, the reason for these experiences can be found in the society. Knowledge that is constructed from the experiences of women⁴ informs the oppressive elements in the society. By merging them one can help them to come out of the oppressive issues without any bias or personal interest. A feminist account of harassment will bring in covert elements better than the dominant objectivity practices (Harding, 1995). Universalism⁵ is an illusion. It is a weak concept as it suggests that there is nothing left over. Standpoint theories look for the lives of women who belong to different races, ethnicities, classes etc. Women who are found on different social relations of gender, class, sex will provide nifty knowledge on the social relations and experiences (Harding, 1995). Though location is important in standpoint theories, it does not insist on one's consciousness⁶. Various available social relations cannot be changed by having a willingness to do so (Harding, 1995). Assumptions are necessary components in producing knowledge. When there is doubt regarding the assumptions that are held on, scientific community⁷ requires retrospection into it. Revision is vital when there is suspicion about belief and observed contents. Standpoint theory offers that room for retrospection. The framework of standpoint theory is an apt research tool in identifying the biases, conflicts of interests and the unconscious interests that influence the researches (Harding, 1995).

Objectivity has traditionally been understood as knowledge produced from a value-neutral and context-independent standpoint. In contrast, standpoint theory argues that all knowledge is situated, emerging from specific social positions and human interests. On this view, objectivity is not achieved by eliminating perspective but by critically acknowledging and articulating the interests that shape knowledge production (Anthony, 2020). What is often termed "strong objectivity" requires incorporating perspectives beyond dominant epistemic frameworks. However, this inclusion remains incomplete, as many standpoints continue to be excluded. This

4 Haraway reminds that "Women's experience" does not pre-exist as a kind of prior resource, ready simply to be appropriated into one or another description. What may count as 'women's experience' is structured within multiple and often inharmonious agendas. 'Experience', like 'consciousness', is an intentional construction, an artefact of the first importance. Experience may also be reconstructed, remembered, rearticulated" (1990, 243).

5 Essentialism is related to universalism as it states that there are properties essential to women, in that any woman must necessarily have those properties to be a woman at all. There are some properties common to all women and then they could not be women in the first place. Gayatri Spivak terms essentialism as a loose tongue.

6 From a standpoint perspective, consciousness or self-awareness arises through a reversal of dominant ways of knowing, shaped by differences in social location and experience within systems of production. Such awareness often develops when individuals or groups occupy marginalized positions or are excluded from dominant cultural frameworks, enabling them to perceive social structures from a critical vantage point.

7 Feminist empiricism has been criticized by other feminist theorists for being internally inconsistent with the empiricist framework it seeks to revise. By suggesting that women or those informed by feminist critique can produce better or more reliable knowledge, it departs from the empiricist assumption that scientific inquiry is independent of the researcher's social identity. In doing so, it calls into question the traditional empiricist notion of objectivity as value-neutral and detached from social context.



raises a further question: should we move toward a model that recognizes a plurality of epistemic values rather than assuming a single, unified standard of objectivity?

Since the starting point of the standpoint theory is the life of the downtrodden ones, the standpoint projects also will be different as the lives of the downtrodden ones are different. The variety will promote queries on different knowledge related issues. The standpoint theory offers a model for other disciplines and opens the possibility of cross examination and multi-level investigation. These varieties can be made use as better resources. However, she raises certain critiques the standpoint theory from different angles. Haraway (1988) considers the standpoint notion of Harding as undetectable and injudicious due to the difficulties associated to present answerability. She critiques the totalizing and unitary ideal of standpoint. As the standpoints of the downtrodden are not impeccable locus, they require critical examination and interpretation. To pursue the perspectives of the oppressed, an embodied self requires linguistic and bodily skills. The inclination towards the oppressed, according to Haraway (1988), is followed by the standpoint epistemologists to avoid relativism. Instead of totalizing versions, she proposes for partial, locatable critical knowledge that maintains the possibility for webs of connections and shared conversations in epistemology. She stands for an objectivity that favors contestation, deconstruction, passionate construction, webbed connections and through that she looks for transformation of system of knowledge and ways of seeing. In order to see well, she suggests a loyal and lively slant devoid of identity politics⁸.

Situated Knowledge of Donna Haraway

Donna Haraway is a prominent feminist philosopher of science whose work redefines objectivity by foregrounding embodiment, positionality, and accountability in knowledge production. According to Haraway, "Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges" (1988, 577). She advances the doctrine of embodied objectivity, which creates space for critical, reflexive, and even paradoxical perspectives. In this view, feminist objectivity is inseparable from situated knowledge. Haraway challenges conventional notions of objectivity that deny partiality and situatedness, arguing instead that partial perspectives and positional awareness foster stronger, more accountable knowledge. For her, partiality and situatedness signify self-reflexive awareness of the material, social, and historical conditions that make knowledge possible. Some philosophers were interested presenting their reflections aided by metaphors. Similarly, Donna Haraway (1988) initiates the metaphor vision in order to explain her thesis. Every vision comes from a location and it is situated. Visualizing technologies do not have any limit. Vision enables one to get into anywhere and reveal the elements of the abyss. However, she goes after particular and specific vision as the unlimited vision stands in support of pre-eminence. She wants to say that every individual sees through a peculiar position and distinct body. It supports her view that the objective vision is possible only

8 Strong objectivity and agential realism emphasize diffraction rather than reflection. Diffraction refers to the generation of new patterns of difference in the world, rather than merely reproducing or displacing the same content as in reflective processes.



through limited viewpoints⁹. One needs to see using one's own body which has the capacity for stereoscopic vision. When one does it s/he has to relinquish the visualization practices of the dominant culture and adopt possible mediatory techniques. Haraway reminds that the irresponsible adapted practices of visualization lead to false vision. In other words, objectivity¹⁰ is achieved through responsible and ethical acts. Knowledge makers are accountable for situated knowledge making.

Diffraction is a phenomenon in physics and it happens when waves are hindered or imbricate on their path. Diffraction patterns are models that make a difference. Haraway (1988) uses diffraction as an optic metaphor. Diffraction is about making a difference in the world by observing the body. Scientific reflexivity only creates antagonistic division between the real and the imaginary. Diffraction helps one to be aware of differences in the world and its effect on the situated bodies. A person who follows diffractive thinking is critical and creative, amenable and accountable in his commitment to the world. According to Haraway, "only partial vision promises objectivity" (1988, 578) Partial vision stands for the way in which situatedness and partiality cause the spontaneous knowledge production with reference to the historical and material ambience. The multidimensional nature of subjectivity and the knowing self as the never finished original self is always constructed and it can see together without claiming to be another. Here the scientific knower attains the subject position; s/he doesn't go after any identity and the objectivity is of partial connections.

To make knowledge claims, Haraway suggests epistemologies of location¹¹, position and situating in which partiality not universality becomes a condition. Knowledge is achieved in and through the world. World should be seen as an agent acting on the human. Situated knowledges are knowledges from distinct dispositions. Their distinct nature brings in exact elaborate and enlightening vision. It's complex, contradictory and structured bodily view than a simplistic transcendental view. Situated knowledge is about communities not isolated individuals. Connections are of global and local and that of the local relations that globalize (Anthony & Yadav, 2025). They are not of representation but of regeneration. The science question is about positioned rationality in which partial views are joined together to form a view from somewhere. Faithfulness to the account of the real world will remove the ambiguity and brings in objectivity. Objectivity in the normal sense does not support partiality and situatedness. Haraway (1988) confronts the normal view point. Her concept of material semiotic actor states that the object of knowledge with its features

9 Nietzsche (1967) too reminds us to pursue objectivity and vision that helps embodied vision. He says "Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject" [which] demand[s] that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking.... There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be."

10 According to Kuhn (1962), as the science progresses it undergoes paradigm shifts. New paradigm shifts help the scientists to consider those things which were not valid before.

11 The ecological thinking supported by Lorraine Code (2006) too defends contextually situated, imaginative and socially aware way of knowledge building up that is in opposition with the epistemological monoculture of Western philosophy.



of facticity and vibrancy is an active meaning generating structure of bodily production. The boundaries of body shape up in social interaction. Biological bodies are not merely given structure but structure to be discovered. Bodies as objects of knowledge, come to existence by knowing the partial subjects that has the power to make them. It is not a passive matter but a meaning generating structure. Haraway calls it as material semiotic actors. Feminist objectivity brings in surprises and ironies in knowledge production. It can initiate heterogeneous accounts of the world. Multitudes of feasible stands produce many knowledges¹². World is not a passive resource. We must learn to communicate with the world. Situated knowledge requires that the object of knowledge be considered as an agent and an actor not as a resource.

A Comparison between Standpoint Theory and Situated Knowledges

Important convergences can be identified in the epistemological projects of Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway. Both reject universalist claims to knowledge, arguing that what presents itself as universal often conceals a particular standpoint shaped by historically dominant social groups. Against the universalist image of the self as an abstract, autonomous individual detached from society and tradition, both thinkers emphasize the socially embedded, historically formed, and relational nature of knowing subjects. Both Harding and Haraway are critical of empiricism, including feminist empiricism. Feminist empiricists generally argue that androcentric distortions in research result from individual bias and can be corrected through stricter adherence to scientific method. Harding disputes this assumption, contending that androcentric hypotheses are often embedded within community belief systems and institutional priorities; therefore, methodological rigor alone cannot eliminate bias. She argues that feminist empiricism's reliance on scientific procedure is insufficient because women's movements and marginalized experiences already contain critical epistemic resources independent of formal scientific frameworks. Standpoint theory, by contrast, functions as a conflict model that foregrounds power relations and emphasizes the epistemic privilege of marginalized groups. While empiricist and liberal models present themselves as politically neutral, standpoint theory explicitly recognizes knowledge production as politically situated. Harding nevertheless considers both feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory as successors to science insofar as they retain a commitment to the possibility of objective knowledge.

Haraway likewise critiques empiricism for advancing a universalist and foundationalist epistemology that obscures the locatable and partial nature of knowledge. She argues that empiricist approaches misdiagnose androcentrism by focusing narrowly on methodological procedure while neglecting the broader socio-cultural and epistemic structures that sustain dominance. Both theorists challenge the neutrality ideal in scientific research. Claims of value neutrality have historically presented knowledge as independent of the knower, while masking Eurocentric and androcentric assumptions. Standpoint inquiry and situated knowledge approaches expose the power relations and epistemic violence concealed within supposedly neutral frameworks.

12 Relativists have critiqued standpoint theory for its tendency to essentialise the experience of marginalized group by considering them as homogenous. They focus on multiple standpoints which could be different sections among women.



Self-reflexivity is central to both frameworks, though articulated differently. For Harding, reflexivity requires critical examination of the researcher's social location and the systematic inclusion of marginalized standpoints in order to achieve strong objectivity. Haraway extends reflexivity beyond reflection by proposing diffraction as a critical method that maps differences and relational effects rather than mirroring reality. Her diffractive approach emphasizes accountability, relationality, and responsible knowledge-making. Harding urges researchers to interrogate cultural assumptions embedded in inquiry, although she does not prescribe a single methodological technique. Haraway provides a more explicit epistemic strategy through diffraction and situated knowledge practices. Despite these methodological differences, neither thinker follows a Cartesian transcendental path toward disembodied self-reflection; both reject the possibility of a view from nowhere.

Harding defends the epistemic starting point of marginalized lives because such positions can yield more objective and transformative accounts of social reality (Anthony, 2025). Haraway, while acknowledging the epistemic value of subjugated positions, insists that these perspectives are not automatically authoritative and must be critically interpreted, decoded, and situated within networks of meaning. Her notion of partial perspective suggests that some viewpoints are more illuminating for feminist critique and scientific understanding, yet no standpoint is complete or immune from critique. Finally, standpoint theory typically requires that the knowing subject engage politically and epistemically with marginalized positions, whereas Haraway's model allows for shifting, relational identities and partial connections rather than a singular standpoint identification. While both affirm the epistemic significance of marginalized experience, Haraway stresses ongoing critical examination and relational accountability, thereby expanding the scope of feminist epistemology beyond fixed identity positions. Their approaches provide complementary resources for critiquing dominant epistemologies, exposing power in knowledge production, and developing reflexive, socially accountable forms of inquiry.

Conclusion

The work of Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway is foundational to feminist and social epistemology, particularly in articulating the theses of situated knowledge and epistemic advantage. The situated knowledge thesis holds that what can be known is shaped by one's social and historical position, which both enables and constrains inquiry. The epistemic advantage thesis further argues that marginalized standpoints can yield critical insight into structures of power that remain obscured from dominant perspectives. These positions reject the ideal of value-neutral objectivity while retaining a commitment to more rigorous and accountable knowledge practices. They expose how dominant research paradigms often conceal the social conditions under which knowledge is produced, thereby reinforcing feminist critiques of traditional empiricism. Philosophy, as a reflective engagement with human experience, provides the conceptual tools to systematize these insights within broader theories of knowledge. Because experience is socially mediated, attention to diverse lived realities becomes epistemically significant. This aligns with the aims of social epistemology, which studies how belief formation, justification, and knowledge production are shaped by social interactions, norms, and institutions. On this view,



justification is not merely an individual cognitive achievement but a socially embedded process involving dialogue, critique, and epistemic responsibility. Within such a framework, Harding's notion of strong objectivity and Haraway's account of situated knowledges emphasize the positionality of knowers, the role of power in structuring inquiry, and the need for reflexivity. A comparative analysis of their approaches clarifies both the promise and limits of epistemic privilege, particularly in relation to questions of objectivity, partiality, and authority. Together, their work shows that knowledge claims grounded in reflexive awareness of social location can be more reliable and more responsive to conditions of inequality, thereby offering normative guidance for responsible belief formation in socially structured contexts. A key limitation of these approaches lies in the difficulty of establishing shared standards for evaluating conflicting standpoints and preventing the drift toward epistemic fragmentation. Future work can respond to this challenge by formulating more robust criteria for dialogue across perspectives and by broadening the framework to engage a wider range of global and interdisciplinary contexts.

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